30 Perri, 637 F. 2d, at 1336 (“The District Court found that Perri knew that a straw man transaction would be against the law”); Stein`s, 649 F. 2d, at 468 (“The recording shows that the applicant`s agents were informed of the requirements of the law and recognized an understanding of the secretary`s rules. Yet, despite the Secretary`s repeated warnings, violations continue to be committed” (omitting the footnote)); The Office of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 505 F. Supp. 695, 698 (ND Fla. 1980) (“Bureau officials inspected Powers on August 31, 1976. They drew attention to his many violations, gave him a copy of the regulations, explained his obligations in depth and gave him a brochure explaining his commitments. At that time, Powers knew his commitments”; Shyda Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 448 F. Supp.
409, 415 (MD Pa. 1977) (“The applicant for the formal administrative hearing admitted under oath that he was aware of the concrete legal obligation in question”); Mayesh v. Schultz, 58 F. R. D. 537, 540 (SD Ill. 1973) (“The undisputed evidence clearly shows that the applicant was aware of the above-mentioned requirements for length of detention. Mr. Mayesh had already been consulted on the requirements of the Illinois law and he clearly admitted that he was aware of them.
McLemore v. United States Treasury Department, 317 F. Supp. 1077, 1078 (ND Fla. 1970) (finding that both the owner of the pawnshop and his employees were aware of the law). 13 Cf. z.B. Heikkinen v United States, 355 U. p.
273, 279 (1958) (“There can be no intentional failure of an expellee within the meaning of Article 20(c) to apply for and identify himself with a country ready to receive him in the absence of evidence. a “bad purpose” or an “indefensible excuse” or similar. He cannot be said to have acted “intentionally”, that is, with a “bad cause” or without “justified excuses”; United States v. Murdock, 290 U. at 389, 394 (1933) (“[W]hen used in a criminal statue [intentional] generally means an act committed by misuse”); Felton v. United States, 96 U. at 699, 702 (1878) (“To do or refrain from doing something knowingly and intentionally implies not only knowledge of the thing, but also determination with ill intent to do or omit it.” The word “intentional,” says Chief Justice Shaw, “in the ordinary sense of the term, in which it is used in the statutes, means not only `voluntary,` but with a bad cause. 20 selections….